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EVALUATING FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
AND COOPERATION IN THE ASEAN
Brendan Harvey*
Financial integration is less pronounced in the ASEAN than other mea-
sures of economic integration. This is particularly apparent when com-
pared against other regions that have undergone similar integrative efforts,
such as the European Union. Cross-border trade flows, foreign-direct in-
vestment, and investment in capital goods outstrip other investment flows.
Regional institutional and legal structures governing these investment
flows, while limited, present marked achievements towards creating an
ASEAN financial community. The gap persists despite suggestions that the
Asian Financial Crisis and the Global Financial Crisis (or the North Atlan-
tic Financial Crisis from the Asian and Stiglitz perspective) would acceler-
ate financial regionalism as a way to create a wider safety net against
sudden capital outflow or capital stoppage. This paper will endeavor to
offer legal, governance, and institutional explanations to explain the impe-
tus for the ASEAN to integrate within itself instead of the Western financial
system. It will offer suggestions to augment financial integration by making
changes to the most effective initiatives.
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INTRODUCTION
The extent of financial integration amongst East Asia’s developing and
industrializing economies matches neither the orotund praise exhausted in
its support after the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis, nor the degree of
economic regional integration otherwise enjoyed by the region.1  Evidence
suggests that regional financial integration lags significantly behind re-
gional trade integration and that Asian economies maintain stronger fi-
nancial links with the rest of the world than with other economies in the
region.2  Regional institutions and organizations in and around the finan-
cial sector are scarce and lack significant influence.3  The interaction be-
tween national and international financial institutions is limited, even
between nations such as Singapore, the Republic of Korea, and Japan,
which have comparatively sophisticated financial marketplaces.4
This disconnect is particularly pronounced amongst the nations of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or the ASEAN.5  The ASEAN
consists of a diverse group of ten rapidly growing economies, each at dif-
ferent stages of economic and financial development: Vietnam, Thailand,
Singapore, the Philippines, Myanmar, Malaysia, Lao PDR, Indonesia,
Cambodia, and Brunei.6  The fact that financial integration has not been a
primary concern for this region is not surprising given its tumultuous his-
tory—the region was embroiled in several armed conflicts when the
ASEAN was founded in 1967.7  The ASEAN was formed principally as an
organization dedicated to preventing war within the region through real
economic benefit.8
In the decades following its inception, as a way of achieving its primary
goal of economic well-being, the ASEAN focused on increasing integra-
tion with the global economy and global financial system.  The ASEAN
adopted the Washington Consensus policies supporting financial and trade
1. Nasha Ananchotiku, Shi Piao & Edda Zoli, Drivers of Financial Integration: Impli-
cations for East Asia, 3-5 (Asian Dev. Bank, Working Paper WP/15/160 2015).
2. See generally Eduardo Borensztein & Prakash Loungani, Asian Financial Integra-
tion: Trends and Interruptions (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 11/4, 2011).
3. Douglas Arner, Paul Lejot & Wei Wang, Assessing East Asian Financial Integra-
tion, 12 SINGAPORE Y.B. OF INT’L L. 1, 1 (2008).
4. See id.
5. See Geert Almekinders, Satoshi Fukuda, Alex Mourmouras, Jianping Zhou &
Yonga S. Zhou, ASEAN Financial Integration (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 15/
34, 2015).
6. Id.
7. The ASEAN was established during the height of the Vietnam War. Indonesia had
just been at war with Malaysia over its colonies. Malaysia had recently defeated a communist
insurgency, while Indonesia had rebuffed an army coup.
8. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Dec-
laration) (Aug. 8, 1967), http://asean.org/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration-bang
kok-8-august-1967/.
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liberalization in pursuit of these economic goals.9  Additionally, economic
interactions within the region, especially trade and investment interac-
tions, increased.10  At the same time, the growing role of financially so-
phisticated markets in the Asian growth model set the stage for the Asian
Financial Crisis of 1997.11  The Asian Financial Crisis christened an impor-
tant turning point in the role of finance in the ASEAN economies and
marked what would become a push towards financial regionalism.12  Dur-
ing the subsequent decades, ASEAN economies continued to focus on ex-
port-led growth, but “now combined with gradual financial liberalization,
regional cooperation on issues of common concern and accumulation of
defensive foreign exchange reserves.”13
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007 marked another important point in
the ASEAN’s financial development.  The wake of the Global Financial
Crisis gave purchase to the idea that the ASEAN should pivot away from
increasing integration with European and U.S. financial systems to instead
focus on more balanced domestic and regional relationships.14  Both the
Asian Financial Crisis and the Global Financial Crisis evinced a growing
reluctance to accept either the dominance of the Western financial system
or the ability of the International Monetary Fund—which had played a
pivotal role in souring the Asian Tigers on Western financial hegemony at
the height of the Asian Financial Crisis—to intervene in the bloc’s finan-
cial affairs.  While both the crises highlighted the necessity of addressing a
range of issues relating to financial integration, the Asian Financial Crisis
in particular showed the ASEAN nations that there was a pressing need
for a regional credit institution more aware of its members’ economic and
fiscal realities.15  Recognizing this, the central banks and governments of
the ASEAN (and the ASEAN+3)16  embarked on several new initiatives
for regional financial cooperation, including: economic surveillance over-
seen by the Economic Review and Policy Dialogue, a regional liquidity
9. See QIAO LIU, PAUL LEJOT & DOUGLAS ARNER, FINANCE IN ASIAN INSTITU-
TIONS: REGULATION AND POLICY 65 (2013).
10. See generally Douglas Arner & Lotte Schou-Zibell, Reforming The Global Finan-
cial Architecture: Implications for Asia, 53 JAPANESE Y.B. INT’L L. 64, 66 (2010).




15. See id.; see also Jordan Kahn, Southeast Asia and the IMF: One Decade Following
the Economic Crisis, an Analogous Regional Institution is Needed to Withstand Contagion
from Wall Street, 26 SING. L. REV. 32, 32-33 (2008) (showing that, in the case of Thailand,
Indonesia, and Malaysia, IMF recovery packages can correlate inversely with IMF
involvement).
16. The ASEAN+3 is comprised of the ASEAN member states plus the People’s Re-
public of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.
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support facility called the Chiang Mai Initiative, and local currency bond
market initiatives.17
This Note describes how economic and financial aspects of regional
governance in the ASEAN has become manifest in loose transnational or-
ganizations and agreements with varying degrees of success.  Section I de-
scribes three important drivers of regional integration that make the
ASEAN’s efforts a worthwhile undertaking: (1) the cost of financial inter-
mediation abroad, which unnecessarily drives up the cost of capital when it
returns to the region; (2) lingering animosity towards the IMF’s actions
during the Asian Financial Crisis; and (3) a respect for regional coopera-
tion styled as the “ASEAN Way.”  Additionally, Section I finds that these
are strong reasons for the ASEAN to prefer regional integration over inte-
gration with the (predominantly Western) international financial architec-
ture.  As this Note will make no attempts to quantify either de facto or de
jure financial integration, these drivers will provide a rubric with which the
ASEAN’s various integration initiatives will be evaluated.  Section II ex-
amines the ASEAN’s attempts to encourage integration in financial ser-
vices, cooperation in monetary policy, and capital market development.
Section III summarizes essential findings that the organizations, while not
as robust as other attempts at financial integration, such as those in the
European Union (EU), are successful insofar as they create an integrative
architecture.
I. REGIONAL OVER GLOBAL INTEGRATION
The ASEAN’s reasons for preferring further regional integration over
global integration can be broadly divided into financial and governance
reasons.  The financial reasons are rooted in the inefficient intermediation
of Asian savings that arise from the region’s relatively undeveloped finan-
cial systems, the slate of risks related to volatile capital flows from the
West, the geography of information, and network externalities.18  The gov-
ernance reasons are rooted in the soft law architecture of international
finance vis-à-vis the “ASEAN Way.”19
This Note does not contend, inter alia, that further regional integration
is manifestly better than global integration.  This Note refers to de-integra-
tion from the global financial marketplace as “decoupling.”20  The idea of
decoupling the ASEAN from its trade and financial connection with the
rest of the world refers to weakening or eliminating “the impact of de-
17. Masahiro Kawai, From the Chiang Mai Initiative to an Asian Monetary Fund, 3
(Asian Dev. Bank Inst. Working Paper, ADBI Working Paper 527, 2015).
18. See generally Maria Socorro Gochoco-Bautista & Eli M. Remolona, Going Re-
gional: How to Deepen ASEAN’s Financial Markets (Asian Dev. Bank, ADB Economics
Working Paper Series No. 300, 2012).
19. See generally Hector Uy, ASEAN’s Legal Framework on Financial Integration, 89
PHIL L.J. 231 (2015).
20. See Yung Chul Park, The Global Financial Crisis: Decoupling of East Asia—Myth
or Reality?, iii (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 289, 2011).
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mand and supply shocks emanating from the advanced countries on the
region’s economic performance shocks since the early 1990s. Available
empirical evidence, including the faster recover of East Asia from the 2008
[Global Financial Crisis], does not appear to lend credence to the
decoupling thesis.”21  The Note does argue, however, that the next mea-
surable quantum of integration should be spent strengthening regional ties
instead of global ones.
A. Financial Imperatives
The ASEAN countries face one of two different challenges.  For the
Lao PDR, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Cambodia, the challenge is to grow
their legal institutions and banking systems to provide a basic level of con-
nection to the international marketplace.  For Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia, the challenge is to further deepen
their capital markets without reopening them to the same shocks incurred
during the Asian Financial Crisis.22  The task for the first group is straight-
forward: they can emulate the banking systems of more developed Asian
economies.  The task for the second group, however, is more complicated.
While the second group has made strides in the development of their gov-
ernment bond and equity markets, their corporate bond markets remain
shallow and illiquid.23
Both groups, however, share a common problem: the threat (illustrated
during the Asian Financial Crisis) that bank finance can suddenly dry up.24
The ASEAN nations that developed banking systems have come to de-
pend on those banks.25  When those banks stop lending, these countries
lack an alternative funding stream.26  Traditionally, this alternative stream
is the corporate bond market, which in the West ground to a halt during
the Global Financial Crisis.27  A deeper regional market in ASEAN na-
tions would have welcomed more companies that were starved for money,
particularly those that could not advantage the global credit markets.
Compounding this structural issue is a reversal of expected capital
flows, known as the “Lucas Paradox.”  The Lucas Paradox holds that capi-
tal flows in developing regions flow in an opposite direction—from poor
countries to rich countries.28  The lack of developed financial markets for
capital encourages large investments to route first through large financial
centers.29  This recycling is inefficient because the distant, more developed
21. Id.
22. See Gochoco-Bautista & Remolona, supra note 18, at 1.
23. Id. at 2.
24. See Kawai, supra note 17, at 4.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 5.
27. Gochoco-Bautista & Remolona, supra note 18, at 2.
28. See Robert Lucas, Why Doesn’t Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?, 80
AM. ECON. REV. 92 (1990).
29. Gochoco-Bautista & Remolona, supra note 18, at 2.
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financial centers have no intrinsic advantage over regional financial cen-
ters in providing the information needed by investors.  Asian savings tend
to go abroad in the form of low-yielding reserve assets and return only in
the form of high-interest foreign direct investment.30
TABLE 131
Figure 3: Net Capital Flows (billion $)
For this reason, Asian savings return as investment in the region, but in
the process of intermediation abroad, they return as expensive, high-re-
turn instruments.  Not only does the investment become more expensive
to finance, but this financial intermediation is unnecessarily completed
outside of the region.  This process is inefficient; much of the information
required by investors can be adequately collected within the region.  For
instance, despite the common perception of equity investments as being
increasingly “global,” most of the volatility in the ASEAN is attributed to
regional factors.32
30. Id. at 7.
31. Id. at 8.
32. Gochoco-Bautista & Remolona, supra note 18, at 9; see also Jianxin Wang, Fore-
casting Volatility of Asian Stock Markets: Contributions of Local, Regional, and Global Fac-
tors, 28 ASIAN DEV. REV. 28, 54 (2011) (explaining that, for Morgan Stanley Capital
International indices of dozens of international markets, models with regional volatility fac-
tors produce the best results).
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While capital movement to inter-regional centers is not necessarily
bad, “the assumptions of market completeness, information efficiency, and
the absence of market distortions,” can blind policymakers to the clear
benefits of localized decision-making.33  The generally accepted rationale
for capital account liberalization and for full mobility of capital derives
from the neoclassical assumption of a complete and liquid market without
information asymmetries.  Global capital movement is not unambiguously
welfare-enhancing because the real world is replete with information dis-
tortions.34  Remembering that the promised repayment of the lender is
dependent on some future state where the borrower is capable of repay-
ing, information asymmetry on the side of both lender and borrower
broaches adverse selection problems.  This issue is exemplified by the irra-
tional lending behavior of mortgage originators in the run-up to the
Global Financial Crisis and by the inability of European and U.S. institu-
tions to evaluate the soundness of each other’s financial products.35
“These distortions, replicated and aggregated to the macro level, could
lead to bubbles, panics, and manias in financial asset trading activity that
sometimes lead to full blown crisis, especially if agents involved are sys-
temically important entities.”36
This informational disconnect is, in part, what precipitated the Asian
Financial Crisis.37  The crisis consisted of a massive outflow of foreign cap-
ital as international financiers suddenly lost confidence in the Thai, Indo-
nesian, and Malaysian markets.  Notably, all three countries were in the
process of liberalizing their rules governing foreign direct investment.  Un-
til 1997, they had growth rates high enough that “they were hailed as
‘Asian tigers’ because of their ‘sound economic fundamentals.’ ”38  This
changed in the second half of 1997 when these Asian tigers experienced a
rapid and severe currency devaluation that plunged their countries into a
deep and lasting depression.  Of the many precipitates of the crisis, Joseph
Stiglitz notes that, in the case of Thailand, foreign investors paid too much
attention to Thailand’s acquiescence to certain IMF conditions on ex-
change rates and not enough attention to the political-economic reality of
the nation.39  Pegging the Thai baht to the U.S. dollar (“USD”) created an
illusion of a devaluation-proof security.  Based on this assumption, foreign
investment poured into the Thai real-estate market, where lending deci-
sions were not made “by a decentralized open capital market via arms-
33. See Gochoco-Bautista & Remolona, supra note 18, at 9.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 8.
37. For further discussion of the Asian Financial Crisis, see infra, at I.B.
38. See Kahn, supra note 15, at 39.
39. Cf. id. (contending that Thailand’s bubble economy began with it accepting the
obligations under Article VIII of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement to lift controls on foreign
exchanges).
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lengths transactions, but instead based upon [personal] relationships.”40
This led to a range of transactions that varied from suspect to fundamen-
tally unsound.41  While the unreliability of the Thai real-estate market was
known to other regional actors, this came as a shock to global investors
who quickly withdrew their capital.42
One can, therefore, argue that the relative underdevelopment of finan-
cial systems in the ASEAN limited the gains from further global account
liberalization due to the inefficient savings intermediation and that this
intermediation provided the force behind the capital withdrawal of the
Asian Financial Crisis.  The high growth rate environment in the decade
leading up to the Asian Financial Crisis, combined with the near complete
absence of a regional bond market, meant that ASEAN borrowers had to
turn to global borrowers for capital.43  The ferocity with which Western
investors invested capital in the ASEAN matched the ferocity with which
they later withdrew their capital.
Aside from the paradox of capital flows, which is especially strong in
the ASEAN region, most of the usual arguments for regional integration
apply with greater force to an argument for global integration.  Two of
these arguments are economies of scale and diversification.  Economies of
scale bring depth and liquidity to markets; diversification allows investors
to seek greater returns by balancing their portfolio across different risk
profiles.44  Global integration, rather than regional integration, would bet-
ter advantage economies of scale and allow even wider risk diversification.
The case for greater regionalism is found in the trade-off between “geog-
raphy of information [, which] pulls in the direction of more localized mar-
kets,” and “network externalities [, which] pull toward more [ ] global
40. See id. at 41.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 40 n. 51 (“Thailand further experienced inflation attributable to the big
capital inflows and its [pegging] to the U.S. dollar[.]”). See also JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBAL-
IZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS, 111 (2002) (“In Thailand . . . it was the already bankrupt real
estate firms and those that lent to them who had the most foreign-denominated debt.”).
Olivier Jeanne notes that this is a common feedback loop for developing economies. “The
ebbs and floods of capital flows to developing and emerging market economies are deter-
mined by a number of factors, including the risk appetite of foreign investors, the returns
available in mature markets, and the global business cycle. This [capital flow cycle] is ampli-
fied by several mechanisms. A boom in capital inflows is associated with a buildup in external
debt, real appreciation of domestic currency, and a general rise in the price of domestic as-
sets. These developments mutually reinforce each other, as the rise in the dollar value of
domestic assets increases the ‘internationally acceptable collateral’ on the basis of which do-
mestic agents can borrow abroad.” The problem arises when this cycle flows in reverse: sud-
den capital outflows are associated with depreciation of the domestic currency market and a
decline in the price of domestic assets. Olivier Jeanne, Capital Flow Management and
Macroprudential Policies in Asia, in ASIAN CAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRA-
TION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 91, 94 (2014), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/
files/publication/31180/asian-capital-market-development-integration.pdf.
43. See Gochoco-Bautista & Remolona, supra note 18, at 8.
44. See id.
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markets.”45  Within the ASEAN, this pull strengthens the case for re-
gional integration.
Foundationally, the role of financial markets is to analyze and dis-
tribute information needed by market participants.  How a given investor
chooses to allocate capital is the result of decisions made on the informa-
tion provided by the markets.  This involves two distinct analytical
dimensions:
Geography of information. Depending on the type of asset, the cost of ob-
taining that information would often be lower for investors whose geographic
proximity to sources of information are closer. Such geographic proximity is
especially important for markets that depend on firm-specific information—
particularly equity markets—and less important for markets that depend on
macroeconomic information—such as government bond markets.
Network externalities. The processing of information requires market partici-
pants to interact in various ways, including through trading. This interaction
gives rise to the network of externalities in information that is the fundamen-
tal source of market depth and liquidity. To take effective advantage of such
externalities, markets require a certain size. But once a critical mass is
reached, the advantages become less compelling.46
In markets that are too small, the net geographic costs of information
would dominate the net economic gains from network externalities.  Con-
versely, as markets get larger, the total costs of information rise as the
average distance between investors and investments lengthens.47  Once
the market achieves a certain size, the externalities become important and
the total gains from the network rise sharply.  Once these gains overcome
the geographic costs of information, a financial marketplace can become
an important source of value to the economy.  That most borrowers in the
ASEAN must go abroad to issue in the global USD bond market rather
than in domestic markets is evidence that regional markets have not yet
reached a critical mass.48
There are good reasons, however, to believe that the regional markets
in the ASEAN are now large enough to reach the size required to advan-
tage network externalities.49  Continuing with the example of corporate
bond issuers: one of the most actively traded instruments in the Asian re-
45. See id. at 37.
46. See Gochoco-Bautista & Remolona, supra note 18, at 27 (summarizing the findings
of ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, EMERGING ASIAN REGIONALISM: A PARTNERSHIP FOR
SHARED PROSPERITY (2008)).
47. Id. at 32.
48. Id. at 33.
49. Id. at 44 (further postulating that, in the case of the global corporate bond market,
network externalities may no longer clearly outweigh the geographic information costs faced
by Asian borrowers. In this case, if a regional market reaches critical mass, it may create
gains from localized network externalities that are much larger in size relative to geographic
formation costs. Ultimately, “[t]he existence of such a regional sweet spot for an ASEAN
corporate bond market must be considered no more than a hypothesis at this time”).
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gional index is the iTraxx Asia ex-Japan index.50  Notably, other compara-
bly traded credit instruments are also regional credit default swap indices
rather than global ones.51  The two most actively traded credit instruments
in the world are the DJ CDX North American Investment Grade Index
and the iTraxx Europe Index.52There is no actively traded global credit
default swap index.53
There are several other reasons why regional integration is, on balance,
preferable over further integration with the global financial system.  Gen-
erally, a focus on regional development would grow the capital market-
place and would help provide an alternative funding stream when bank
financing—which has historically been the dominant avenue for ASEAN
borrowers54—dries up.  The undeveloped capital marketplace encourages
capital to move outside of the region to financial intermediaries in the
West before returning home, despite the added costs.  These costs are
magnified by breaks in the neoclassical assumption of the efficient market-
place.  The greatest break is in the lower capacity of Western financial
intermediaries to appreciate the economic reality of the countries in which
they are investing (e.g. the case of investments in Thailand).55  Focusing on
regional integration can further reduce market inefficiencies by better bal-
ancing the costs associated with expanding the geography of information
with the benefits of network externalities.  Much of the volatility in the
Asian marketplace can be attributed to regional factors, therefore, focus-
ing on regional integration could maximize the gains from network exter-
nalities by reducing the overhead associated with expanding geographical
information.
B. Additional Crisis Imperatives
The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 has had an enduring impact on
the ASEAN economies and their imperatives for policy formation.  The
economic and social dislocation in Southeast Asia and the Republic of
Korea, caused by the evaporation of market confidence, produced a con-
cern among state actors that the ASEAN lacked adequate national and
regional crisis remedies.  Specifically, state actors were concerned that
only extra-regional governments and organizations, such as the United
States and the IMF respectively, could provide significant credit infu-




54. Masamichi Kono, Vice Minister for International Affairs, Financial Services
Agency of Japan, Keynote Address at the OECD-ADBI Roundtable on Capital Markets and
Financial Reform in Asia: A New Strategy for Growth Finance in Asia (March 22, 2016)
(“The Asian financial system has been traditionally dominated by banks, and the banking
system has been at the core of the channels for finance growth and development.”).
55. See supra Part I.A. (discussing the Thai real estate market).
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sions.56  These credit infusions came with a set of economic reform pre-
scriptions that have since been criticized.57  To illustrate the effect the
Asian Financial Crisis had on creating an imperative for regional integra-
tion, it is best to return to the case of Thailand, precisely because it has
since been hailed as the IMF’s best student.58
With its central bank essentially insolvent following an attempt to
maintain the baht’s peg to the USD, the Thai government had no choice
but to float the baht by the summer of 1997.59  The value of the baht plum-
meted during the second half of 1997, and the entire Thai economy fol-
lowed suit.60  The stock market collapsed, and nearly half of all bank loans
became non-performing.61  The Thai government announced the closure
of numerous financial institutions and promised to guarantee all outstand-
ing loans and deposits held by the shuttered entities.62  Thailand turned to
the IMF for help, and in August 1997, reached an agreement for a bailout
package of $17 billion USD.63  Disbursement of these funds was condi-
tioned on Washington Consensus compliant reform requirements, which
required: fiscal austerity, contractionary monetary policy, a raise in inter-
est rates, financial sector restructuring, a commitment to completely guar-
antee creditors of Thai financial institutions, deregulation, and
privatization of state-owned enterprises.64
The IMF has since admitted to making mistakes in its efforts to repair
the Thai economy.  It has called its initial prescriptions “flawed in that the
IMF did not expect such a severe economic downturn in the economy.”65
While the IMF did work with Thailand in 1998 to ease the stringent fiscal
and monetary reforms it had required, the Thai economy failed to show
significant signs of recovery.  GDP remained 2.3 percent below pre-crisis
levels, and approximately forty percent of all loans were still non-perform-
ing.66  Chief among the critics of the IMF’s handling of the Thai crisis (and
of the Asian Financial Crisis at large) is Joseph Stiglitz, who contends that
the IMF prioritized repayment of foreign creditors over the stabilization of
the Thai economy.67  He argues:
56. See Arner et al., supra note 3, at 10. For a more intricate analysis of the technical
triggers of the Asian Financial Crisis, see generally John Head, The Asian Financial Crisis in
Retrospect—Observations on Legal and Institutional Lessons Learned after a Dozen Years, 5
E. ASIA L. REV. 31 (2010).
57. See Head, supra note 56, at 65-70.
58. See Kahn, supra note 15, at 47.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Stiglitz, supra note 42, at 112.
62. See Kahn, supra note 15, at 42-43.
63. Id. at 43.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 48.
66. Id.
67. See Head, supra note 56, at 65-70.
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There was an alternative to [the IMF’s] massive interventions. . . . [It] could
have facilitated the workout process; it could have tried to engineer a stand-
still (the temporary interruption of payments) that would have given the coun-
tries—and their firms—time to recoup. . . . It could have tried to create an
accelerated bankruptcy process. But bankruptcy and standstills were not . . .
welcome options, for they meant that the creditors would not be repaid. Many
of the loans were uncollateralized, so in the event of bankruptcy, little might
be recovered.68
Stiglitz also found the high interest rate policy, which the IMF pushed
to stabilize exchange rates, especially problematic.  “[W]hile the high in-
terest rates failed to [stabilize exchange rates], they quickly led to an ex-
plosion of the debt burden.”69  Not only did these contractionary policies
exacerbate the crisis, but they also led to a broad mistrust of the IMF
within the region.  “East Asian nations came out of the experience pro-
foundly shaken and deeply resentful of the reaction of the developed
world as embodied in the [IMF].”70  The ASEAN in particular “found
[IMF] conditions intrusive, inappropriate, and insensitive to specific eco-
nomic and political conditions in affected countries.”71
The crisis exposed the weakness of the ASEAN’s regional institutions.
This weakness was reflected in both the severe contraction of as well as
limited prophylactic attention to regional capital flows.  Before and during
the Crisis, no organization, either within East Asia or within the ASEAN,
was able to provide support to any state.72  Short-term IMF credit was
essential in each case but always came with output-reducing terms and
without concern for the policy of noninterference that had characterized
the ASEAN since its inception.73
While Thailand sought liquidity assistance from Japan at the start of
the crisis,74 neither Japan, the United States, nor the IMF (to whom Japan
had broached the idea of condition-free credit injections), wished to aban-
don the conditionality of loans made under the Washington Consensus.
The impasse led to suggestions for the creation of new regional institutions
to address the potential for a similar crisis in the future, most notably in
Japan’s proposition for an Asian Monetary Fund, but the initiative was
quashed by the United States and the IMF.  Thus, the ASEAN remembers
the conditions as not only disruptive to their domestic economies, but also
likely to be disruptive or at least likely to be beyond debate, should they
need to approach the IMF for future bailouts.75
68. STIGLITZ, supra note 42, at 208, 211-12.
69. See Head, supra note 56, at 66.
70. Id. at 68.
71. Id.
72. Arner et al., supra note 3, at 10.
73. See infra, Section I.C.
74. Arner et al., supra note 3, at 10.
75. See id.
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C. Governance Imperatives
“Peculiar to international finance among the kinds of species of eco-
nomic globalization, are the phenomena of territoriality and regulatory ex-
port of rules of governance.”76  The national law of dominant markets,
informed by the house customs of a nation’s largest financial institutions,
has shaped most of the rules in international finance.77  Owing to the ab-
sence of a unified transnational organization that has the final say on fi-
nancial governance, like that of the World Trade Organization in
international trade, a soft law architecture dominates the flow of funds
between nations.  In the ASEAN context, some argue that “soft law could
also have a role in establishing a legal framework that downplays fluctua-
tions, market over-confidence, and systemic risks” that are unique to this
species of economic integration.78
The regulatory export of house rules without an international gov-
erning body creates obvious oversight problems.  To the extent that host
countries are willing to accept consolidated home country supervision in
place of domestic supervision, global financial institutions can aggressively
expand operations beyond their native borders.79  However, “[s]ince the
recent financial crisis, certain host country supervisors have questioned the
ability of home country supervisors to adequately supervise foreign
branches and to protect the interests of foreign customers.”80  On the
other hand, if host country supervisors refuse to defer to the home country
supervisor, transnational financial institutions will find themselves subject
to oversight by a potentially contradictory latticework of regulatory
authorities.81
The best way to avoid problems related to home-host country supervi-
sion is to ensure intensive cooperation among national regulators.  Super-
vision in this field breaks down to two related tasks: harmonization and
cooperation.82  Harmonization is the task of narrowing differences be-
tween national regulatory regimes, for example, by agreeing upon rules or
establishing common principles.  Harmonization is ultimately a static pro-
cess, as regulatory regimes are codified as law and promulgated.83  Coop-
eration, on the other hand, refers to the development of a dynamic
relationship between regulators, whereby they share information and
make decisions together in real time.84  While harmonization can be
76. Uy, supra note 19, at 233.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Eric J. Pan, Four Challenges to Financial Regulatory Reform, 55 VILL. L. REV. 743,
767 (2010).
80. Id.
81. See id. at 768.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 769.
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achieved through international standard-setting bodies such as the Inter-
national Organization of Securities Commissions or the Basel Committee,
cooperation requires a stronger connection between national regulators.
[T]he optimal conditions for cooperation between regulators occur [ ] when
there is a pre-existing mutual understanding between regulators that comes
about through familiarity with each other’s regulatory frameworks, markets,
and regulatory approaches. Thus, it is more likely for regulators to cooperate
in an effective manner if they focus on developing bilateral, as opposed to
multilateral, cooperative relationships. Cooperation will best take place if
there is both harmonization of standards (i.e., coordination as a prerequisite
of cooperation) and commonality of regulatory interests and philosophies.85
The ASEAN is uniquely suited to meet the qualifications for regula-
tory cooperation in several ways.  First, the ASEAN’s financial economy is
open enough to be called a participant in the global economy, but the
economy is not too open.  The financial transactions in the ASEAN are
focused principally on real economic concerns and not part of the exotic
financial economy.86  This middle-ground necessitates a regionally tailored
regulatory architecture that vitiates wholesale adoption of U.S. or E.U.
regulatory principles.87  Second, the ASEAN has long nurtured a unique
system of cooperation and dispute resolution dubbed the “ASEAN Way.”
Under the ASEAN Way, member states do not interfere with the internal
affairs of other members, and decision-making and dispute resolution are
only done by consensus.88  This non-interference runs the gamut from re-
fraining from public criticism of other members, to refusing to provide
85. Id. at 769-70.
86. Uy, supra note 19, at 236.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 236 n. 21 (“Article 2 of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-
east Asia provides that ASEAN members must abide by the following principles: Mutual
respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity
of all nations; The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external inter-
ference, subversion or coercion Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; Set-
tlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; Renunciation of the threat or use of
force; and Effective cooperation among themselves.”); see also Id. (summarizing the observa-
tions of Michael Ewing-Chow & Tan Hsien-Li, The Role of the Rule of Law in ASEAN
Integration 4-5 (European Univ. Inst. Robert Schuman Ctr. for Advanced Studies, EUI
Working Paper RSCAS 2013/16); ASEAN Vision 2020, ASEAN (Dec. 15, 1997), http://asean
.org/?static_post=asean-vision-2020 (“We envision the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia functioning fully as a binding code of conduct for our governments”);
Michael Ewing-Chow & Tan Hsien-Li, The Role of the Rule of Law in ASEAN Integration 11
(European Univ. Inst. Robert Schuman Ctr. for Advanced Studies, EUI Working Paper
RSCAS 2013/16) (“[P]ractice of flexibility in ASEAN relations is well-ingrained from the
time of ASEAN’s establishment. Beginning with the Bangkok Declaration in 1967, ASEAN
leaders made the deliberate choice to steer clear of binding legal obligations to allow for
more flexible engagement. The . . . Declaration itself is only a political statement . . . that
required no ratification. The ASEAN founding fathers wanted it to be an organization with
minimal legal institutionalization. This was because ASEAN was first and foremost a diplo-
matic instrument for confidence-building at a time when their common concern was the con-
tainment of communist China. This emphasis on flexibility continues to permeate how
ASEAN integration is to proceed.”) (citations omitted).
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sanctuary for insurgent or marginalized groups of other members.89  “In
the Southeast Asian milieu,” with its potential for and history of destabi-
lizing conflicts, “ASEAN’s reinforcement of these general norms on a re-
gional basis has led to the collective legitimization of the states as states”
by their neighbor states.90
Uy and others argue that this standing tradition of noninterference has
not only forced the ASEAN member nations to act as a bloc, but has
helped smooth tensions that normally manifest as the democracy-deficit
criticism in the realm of home-host country supervision.91  It was a direct
multilateral agreement that created the Chiang-Mai Initiative
(“CMI”)92—a network of bilateral swap agreements between the ASEAN
nations to act as a regional liquidity support facility to prevent sudden
capital stoppages.93  Fundamental decisions regarding the CMI—such as
membership—are decided through consensus, while lending issues are de-
cided through majority.94  The ASEAN+3 Finance Minister also commit-
ted to establishing the Macroeconomic Surveillance Office, an
independent regional surveillance unit to support the successful imple-
mentation of the CMI.  The ASEAN Capital Market Forum was founded
with a focus towards projects that harmonize standards in capital market
regulation.  The culture of sovereign respect has (perhaps ironically) also
aided in the creation of a regional dispute mechanism overseen by the
Senior Economic Official Meeting, a body composed of an equal number
of representatives from each member nation’s financial regulatory body.95
D. Potential Downsides
Regional financial integration presents several problems that, while
important, do not ultimately outweigh the potential benefits.  Much of the
criticism focuses on the ripple effect that the collapse of the Thai economy
had on Indonesia and Malaysia.  Once Thailand fell to crisis, Indonesia
89. Tom Ginsburg, Eastphalia and Asian Regionalism, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 859, 871
(2011).
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Uy, supra note 19, at 234-239 (noting that, while incorporating-without-
deliberating global financial principles is the norm for economically weaker nations, the
ASEAN’s policy of mutual noninterference has encouraged the cooperative development of
financial norms).
92. Id.
93. See Kawai, supra note 17, at 6.
94. Uy, supra note 19, at 239.
95. See id. Some argue that the ASEAN Way militates not just in favor of regional
integration, but against global integration. Observing how global investment law paradigms
are codified in the ASEAN, Cho and Kurtz note that the ASEAN Way has established an
overarching norm that “power elites (politicians and bureaucrats) and [other] domestic inter-
est groups” will not want to cede their hegemony to extra-regional norms. See also Sungjoon
Cho & Jurgen Kurtz, The Limits of Isomorphism: Global Investment Law and the ASEAN
Investment Regime, 17 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 341, 364-66 (2017) (explaining that power elites will
strive to protect the economic regime that has formed around the ASEAN Way).
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was immediately divested by foreign investors.96  The contagion is
credited to the countries sharing similar structural faults, in addition to the
nations being in trade competition.97  When the Thai baht collapsed in
1997, the Malaysian ringgit, which was also pegged to the USD, exper-
ienced identical selling pressure and self-immolated by year’s end.98
Greater regional integration could exacerbate these problems in future
crises.  A region-wide convergence of institutions, rules, and practices
could expose the entire ASEAN to identical structural defects that ulti-
mately caused the Asian Financial Crisis to spread from Thailand to Ma-
laysia.  As one of the goals of financial integration is the development of
the ASEAN’s capital marketplace,99  ASEAN securities may begin to
move as a single class, making each member state more vulnerable to simi-
lar economic shocks.100
This risk is particularly pronounced for the ASEAN’s low income
countries (“LIC”), the Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Cambodia.  Greater capi-
tal inflows from the advanced ASEAN economies have played a key role
in developing these countries’ commodity and manufacturing sectors.101
While these capital flows have been critical in raising productivity and eco-
nomic growth, they have also increased these LICs’ exposure to the busi-
ness cycles of the more advanced economies.102  Greater regional
integration thus makes these LICs susceptible to the same capital stop-
pages and retractions that helped precipitate the Asian Financial Crisis.
Further criticisms can be drawn by analogy to international trade the-
ory, particularly the infant-industry argument for tariff barriers.  This idea
supposes that a tariff is beneficial to a new industry while it learns to be
efficient and competitive with international markets.103  In this Note’s
measure of financial integration, the analogous argument holds that favor-
ing regional financial integration functions as a pseudo-tariff barrier
against accessing the global financial marketplace.  Trade theory normally
overcomes this argument by showing that while a tariff barrier can address
a valid market distortion, there are far superior policies that address the
market distortion directly.104  This is where the analogous argument fails:
96. See Kahn, supra note 15, at 44.
97. Id. at 44-45.
98. Id. at 46.
99. See infra at Section II.C.
100. Michael Plummer & Ganeshan Wignaraja, Integration Strategies for the ASEAN:
Alone, Together, or Together with Neighbors? 18-19 (East-West Ctr., Working Paper No. 92,
2007).
101. IMF, Asia Pacific: Managing Spillovers and Advancing Economic Rebalancing,
Regional Economic Outlook (Apr. 2012) at 43.
102. Id.
103. See JOHN JACKSON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 33-34 (6th ed. 2013).
104. See id.
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the distortion that is being addressed in the case of needless extra-regional
financial intermediation and capital outflows is precisely the movement of
capital outside of the region.  Moreover, the financial integration being
measured here is not a zero-sum game; rather, it is the reason that the
ASEAN must develop its own institutions as an alternative without erect-
ing legal barriers against the global financial system.
The final opposing view is that the IMF is nevertheless the best institu-
tion to oversee transnational financial policy.  Since its inception in De-
cember 1945, the IMF has constantly been refining its advisory and
supervisory capacities and regularly intervening during financial crises
throughout the world.105  The IMF is still troubled by an institutional bias
towards Western powers.  The three tiers of the IMF leadership—the man-
aging director, executive board, and the board of governors—reflect the
economic power of the countries at World War II.106  In the board of gov-
ernors, China and Japan control less than ten percent of the vote.107  The
ASEAN controls just over three percent.108  The problem with increased
IMF supervision is twofold.  First, the role the IMF played in the Asian
Financial Crisis is disqualifying.  Second, one can only sustain the argu-
ment that the IMF nevertheless offers the ASEAN compelling reasons to
remain under its auspices on the grounds that its analytical and regulatory
capacity surpass the extant ASEAN system.  While true, the IMF itself
admits that this is only a reason for the ASEAN to be gradual in its pivot
away.109
E. What is at Stake?
“In theory, financial integration can bring important benefits to a
country and to a region.”110  ASEAN member nations’ financial systems
remain primarily bank-centered,111 despite the expansion of insurance
company and pension fund activity.112  Financial integration can spur the
development of the financial sector and the development of more sophisti-
cated financial products.  This development can boost growth, employ-
ment, and open new markets for ASEAN’s poorer regions.  Integration
can also help facilitate the development of deeper, more liquid markets
that will in turn lower the cost of capital, improve resource allocation, and
create a more diverse risk pool.
For the ASEAN in particular, an important component of financial in-
tegration is satisfying one of the bloc’s primary objectives: “to create a
105. See Kahn, supra note 15, at 32-37.
106. Id. at 37-38.
107. Id. at 38.
108. Id.
109. See Almekinders et al., supra note 5, at 20-30.
110. Id. at 13.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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single market and production base which is stable, prosperous, highly com-
petitive, and economically integrated with effective facilitation for trade
and investment.”113  The table below highlights the wide divergence in fi-
nancial development among the ASEAN countries.114
TABLE 2. CREDIT TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR115
 Private Sector Credit GDP Credit Growth 
 (in percent of GDP) per capita (in percent) 





Indonesia 46 20 28 36 3,510 23 20 
Malaysia 105 137 120 134 10,457 11 10 
Philippines 18 42 30 36 2,791 15 16 
Singapore 84 96 130 173 55,182 14 16 
Thailand 83 108 97 121 5,676 15 10 
Brunei  50 41 31 39,659 -1 7 
Cambodia  6 28 45 1,028 27 27 
Lao P.D.R.  14 22 39 1,594 41 36 
Myanmar  5 15 1,113 59 66 
Vietnam  35 115 97 1,902 18 13 
China 87 122 130 136 6,747 17 15 
India 35 36 54 57 1,505 18 15 
Japan 126 117 107 115 38,491 0 5 
Korea 122 129 154 156 24,329 5 3 
Sources: CEIC Data Company Ltd.; Haver Analytics; and IMF staff estimates 
The aforementioned financial, governance, and crisis imperatives offer
very specific benefits to the ASEAN region and provide compelling rea-
sons why the bloc should integrate financially.  Developing more robust
regional capital markets can help cut the cost of financial intermediation
and protect against the sudden flight of capital.  Creating a regional credit
facility more attuned to the economic necessity of member nations can
avoid the sting of IMF conditionality in the event of further crisis.  Simi-
larly, developing more robust regional institutions can both draw from and
reinforce the ASEAN Way of mutual respect on which the bloc was
founded.
The question remains, however, of how to evaluate the ASEAN’s inte-
gration initiatives.  In lieu of a quantitative metric, we can look to the im-
peratives themselves for guidance.  Thus, the operative question becomes:
To what degree do the ASEAN’s various undertakings address the
problems identified above?  We may also posit a more basic question,
113. ASEAN Charter, art. 1, ¶ 5, Aug. 8, 1967, http://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/
images/archive/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf.
114. Almekinders et al., supra note 5, at 13.
115. Id.
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drawing on more fundamental conceptions of institutional efficacy: Are
the rules, qualifications, and criteria clearly explained?  Or, is there an en-
forcement mechanism where necessary?
II. INTEGRATION INITIATIVES
Financial integration is associated with capital mobility and is defined
as the extent to which an economy’s financial system is not shielded or
otherwise made separate from other national or international markets.
There are a number of ways to quantify financial integration, such as in-
tensive versus extensive measures and de facto versus de jure measures.116
Such integration is hard to identify and measure consistently since it can
only be measured by proxy values and since its use has been historically
conflated with other measures of economic integration.117  This Note
makes no attempts to quantify financial integration within the region.
While the study of this “true” financial integration can help divine the
variables that contribute to a convergence of financial asset prices between
markets, the analysis in this Note is more concerned with the regional in-
stitutions wanted by ASEAN market participants given the imperatives
for integration addressed above.  What this survey will show is that, while
early attempts have been largely ineffectual, efforts to create regional sur-
veillance institutions, capital market development initiatives, and several
credit facilities establish a working framework for a regional financial
community.
A. Financial Services & the ASEAN Economic Community
Limited growth has occurred in the regional trade in financial services
and any improvement is likely to occur slowly.  This sub-section discusses
cooperation in financial services liberalization, the ASEAN Free Trade
Area (“AFTA”), the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services, the
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (“APEC”), the ASEAN-
China free trade agreement, and the ASEAN-ANZ free trade agreement.
All of these agreements were incorporated in the ASEAN Economic
Community (“AEC”) in 2015.
1. ASEAN Free Trade Area (“AFTA”)
Any conceptual success secured by AFTA obscures its institutional
deficit compared to more mature regional trade organizations.  AFTA is
administered by neither rule nor principle and maintains an informal ori-
entation that emphasizes consultation backed by a toothless enforcement
mechanism.  Since AFTA was formally adopted by the Fourth ASEAN
Summit in 1992, the agreement has been gradually expanded to include all
116. See generally Dennis Quinn, et al., Assessing Measures of Financial Openness and
Integration, 59 INT’L MONETARY FUND ECON. REV. 488 (2011).
117. See generally id.
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the member states under a commitment to reduce area tariffs to zero.118
This is referred to as the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme
(“CEPT”).  The CEPT includes several exceptions to the zero-tariff com-
mitment, notably the “general exceptions,” or “products which a country
deems necessary for the protection of national security, public morals, the
protection of human, animal or plant life and health, and protection of
articles of artistic, historic, or archeological value.”119
The AFTA typifies many of the problems presented by other ASEAN
integration initiatives.  The AFTA is a nonbinding declaration of intent,
the application and implementation of which is left to the national customs
and trade authorities in each member state.120  This declaration-based ap-
proach to cooperation adopted by the ASEAN can be viewed as one re-
sponse to the problem presented by the need to maximize participation
without breaching the ASEAN Way.121  While this flexibility enhances the
probability of agreement and participation in a legal regime—only one
percent of customs items are subject to the CEPT exception122—it also
tends to compromise legal integrity and enforceability.123  Any member
could, without seeking approval of any other, declare any class of goods
exempt under the general exceptions and re-impose a tariff.  The AFTA
also has a toothless enforcement mechanism.  The ASEAN Protocol on
Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (“Protocol”) governs formal
dispute resolution.  ASEAN members may, after direct negotiations with
one another, petition the Senior Economic Officials Meeting (“SEOM”)
to submit the dispute to the Protocol for formal review.124  SEOM deci-
sions require consensus among all ASEAN members, however, which will
always include the aggrieved party and the alleged transgressor.125  While
the AFTA appears to have achieved its goal of largely eliminating regional
trade barriers—in a way that preserves the ASEAN Way by leaving imple-
mentation to domestic authorities—the lack of enforcement mechanisms
ultimately undercuts the agreement’s potential to foster and maintain re-
gional integration absent good will.  This makes AFTA non-cohesive
rather than rigorous or integrated.  At base, AFTA cannot be called a
marked step towards integration as it merely reduces to paper standard
international negotiation.
118. See John P. Goyer, ASEAN Free Trade Area: Making the Region More Investment
Competitive, 18 No. 4 E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP. 9 (1996).
119. See Common Effective Preferential Tariff, US-ASEAN BUS. COUNCIL, INC., https:/
/www.usasean.org/regions/asean/afta/common-effective-preferential-tariff (last updated Sep.
17, 2016).
120. See Peter Kenevan & Andrew Winden, Flexible Free Trade: The ASEAN Free
Trade Area, 34 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 224, 239-240 (1993).
121. See id. at 226.
122. See Common Effective Preferential Tariff, supra note 119.
123. Kenevan & Winden, supra note 120, at 226.
124. Id. at 226-27.
125. Id.
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2. ASEAN’s Framework Agreement on Services (“AFAS”)
The 1995 AFAS seeks to reduce barriers to trade and financial ser-
vices.  It requires members only to negotiate to lift restrictions in specific
market segments and to expand upon their commitments under the World
Trade Organizations’ General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”)
as it is applied to other member states.  While information on the AFAS is
extremely limited, a report commissioned by Australia’s Office of Re-
gional Economic Policy support facility finds this agreement “both disap-
pointing and unimpressive.”126  The report finds that while AFAS has
achieved greater liberalization within the region than did GATS alone, the
margin of preference (the degree to which each member state has substan-
tively acted to reduce barriers to other regional financial service provid-
ers) is extremely wide.127  While nations such as Thailand have almost no
restrictions on the operation of financial service providers, nations like
Brunei and Malaysia require case-by-case government approval and re-
quire local partners.128  The report found, additionally, that those nations
that do have restrictions apply them equally against ASEAN and non-
ASEAN nations.  For these reason, AFAS suffers the same basic flaw that
AFTA suffers: it does not push integration further but merely restates the
status quo with an ASEAN gloss.
3. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (“APEC”)
While not strictly an ASEAN forum, prior to 2000, the APEC was the
preferred forum for ASEAN leaders to establish Asia-Pacific-wide eco-
nomic strategy and has since consisted principally of ASEAN member
states.129  Meetings of the APEC finance ministers commenced in 1993.
This institution has also been characterized as ineffectual.  The group’s di-
versity of interests all but guarantees that informality and flexibility are
central to all proceedings.  This is reflected in the organization’s key docu-
ments.  For example, a resolution issued in 1994 on banking and securities
regulation declares that “[m]ember economies accept that regulatory and
institutional barriers to the outflow of investment will be minimized,” and
that all investors are to be treated equally, with “exceptions as provided
for in domestic laws, regulations and policies [.]”130  Though one cannot
object to the character of these goals, “APEC’s contribution to tangible
126. Arner et al., supra note 3, at 15.
127. See VO TRI TRANH & PAUL BARTLETT, TEN YEARS OF ASEAN FRAMEWORK
AGREEMENT ON SERVICES (AFAS): AN ASSESSMENT 1, 6 (Reg’l Econ. Policy Support Facil-
ity Project No. 05/004 2006), http://aadcp2.org/file/05-004-ExecutiveSummary.pdf.
128. See Arner et al., supra note 3, at 15-16.
129. History, ASIA PAC. ECON. COOPERATION, http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-
APEC/History (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
130. See Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, Joint Statement of the Sixth
APEC Ministerial Meeting (1994), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/Treaty
File/2910.
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integration has been negligible due to its lack of institutional authority and
political fragmentation.”131
4. ASEAN-China Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation (“ACTFA”)
Agreed to in 2002 and amended in 2015, the ACTFA has four primary
objectives: (1) to strengthen and enhance economic, trade, and investment
cooperation; (2) to liberalize and promote trade in goods and services; (3)
to explore new areas of cooperation; and (4) to facilitate economic inte-
gration while reducing gaps in relative development.132  The agreement
commits its signatories to negotiate further liberalization of trade in the
financial services (including establishing rules for foreign investment) with
China.  The ACTFA, like the AFTA and AFAS, is another agreement that
only binds its members to engage in bilateral negotiations.  This agree-
ment has, however, achieved some success.  Out of this agreement, China
entered into independent free trade agreements with Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Brunei in 2010, as well as Cam-
bodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam in 2015.133
While this agreement has been more effective than other financial ser-
vice agreements, it is still unsatisfactory as a regional integration initiative
for several reasons.  ACTFA has no supervisory organization.  “While a
future ACTFA standing body could become a cooperative bridge between
ASEAN and China with respect to trade, organizational aspects of
ACTFA have lagged the development of trade between members, for no
formal ACTFA agency exists.”  It also did not commit the ASEAN to ne-
gotiate with China, but only provided members nations a foundation from
which to enter individual negotiations.
5. ASEAN-Australia/New Zealand Free Trade Agreement
In 2009 the ASEAN members signed free trade agreements individu-
ally with Australia and New Zealand and also signed an agreement estab-
lishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (“ASEAN-
ANZ FTA”).  The agreement spanned trade in goods, financial services,
electronic commerce, investment, and energy.134  While this Agreement is
laudable in its totality for being negotiated between Australia-New Zea-
land and the entire ASEAN community and for setting actual commit-
131. Arner et al., supra note 3, at 18.
132. Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-
operation Between the Association of South East Asian Nations and the People’s Republic
of China, Oct. 6, 2003, http://www.asean.org/uploads/2012/06/22196.pdf.
133. See Arner et al., supra note 3, at 19.
134. See Joint Media Statement on the Signing of the Agreement Establishing the
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area Cha-am, ASS’N OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NA-
TIONS (July 5, 2012), http://asean.org/?static_post=joint-media-statement-on-the-signing-of-
the-agreement-establishing-the-asean-australia-new-zealand-free-trade-area-cha-am-thailand
-27-february-2009.
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ments to reducing tariff barriers, it fails with regards to its finance
provisions.  In addition to a general prudential carve-out clause in Article
3 of the Annex on Financial Services, a further clause enables member
states to adopt or enforce measures necessary to ensure compliance with
domestic laws or regulations.
B. Economic and Financial Surveillance
Several regional forums have emerged to facilitate economic monitor-
ing, continue policy dialogues, and advantage peer pressure for better poli-
cies.135  The ASEAN finance ministers established the ASEAN
Surveillance Process in 1998.  Its objective is to strengthen cooperation by
“(i) exchanging information and discussing economic and financial devel-
opment of member states in the region, (ii) providing an early warning
system and a peer review process to enhance macroeconomic and financial
stability in the region, (iii) highlighting possible policy options and encour-
aging early unilateral or collective actions to prevent a crisis, and (iv) mon-
itoring and discussing global economic and financial developments which
could have implications for the region and propose possible regional and
national level actions.”
In May of 2000, the Surveillance Process was expanded into the Eco-
nomic Review and Policy Dialogue (“ERPD”), which extended the invita-
tion from just the ASEAN’s representative finance ministers to the
finance ministers of the Plus-3 nations (China, Japan and South Korea)
and ASEAN+3 central bank governors.  The expectation was that coun-
tries would implement better macroeconomic and financial sector policy if
they could be pressured annually by their peers.136  Lacking any strong
supporting mechanisms for surveillance, however, the ERPD had a weak
start.  Problems ranged from the absence of a competent secretariat that
could guide the surveillance (and dialogue) process, to the absence of the
central bankers, whose access to domestic market data was critical to the
ERPD’s mission.137
In 2005, the ASEAN+3 authorities undertook to strengthen the
ERPD.  First, the ERPD was integrated into the Chiang-Mai Initiative138
as a dedicated research arm to confirm the financial crisis necessary for its
activation, a role it has maintained to present.139  Without this surveil-
lance, it would be difficult for creditor states to monitor the financial per-
formance of the borrowing state.  Second, the ERPD encouraged member
state’s central bankers to join its internal dialogues.  Central banks have a
strong advantage in macroeconomic and financial surveillance and play
135. See Masahiro Kawai & Peter Morgan, Regional Financial Regulation in Asia 18
(Asia Dev. Bank Inst., ADBI Working Paper 460, 2014).
136. See id.
137. See Kawai, supra note 17, at 11.
138. See generally infra at II.D.
139. See id.
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key roles in the actual disbursement of liquidity once need arises.140
Third, a new surveillance unit, the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research
Office (“AMRO”), was established to support the ERPD by focusing on
prophylactic measures.141  Since its inception in 2011, AMRO has submit-
ted country-specific surveillance reports quarterly.  AMRO is also the only
surveillance institution that has a full-time staff.  It has found success in
establishing its own independent relationship with ASEAN central bank-
ing authorities and regularly conducting country and sector analysis when
requested.142  “AMRO is now in the process of transforming itself into an
international organization, which marks an important milestone in en-
hancing the effectiveness of ASEAN+3 financial cooperation.  In this way,
AMRO is expected to conduct impartial surveillance as an objective, inde-
pendent, international organization.”143
While some progress has been made on the ERPD and the AMRO has
achieved visible success, their overall effectiveness is questionable at best.
The ERPD remains largely a venue for information sharing with weak,
occasional policy review or coordination.144  It has not yet moved into the
more “advanced due diligence” functions—chief amongst which is the
early warning system—envisioned since the inception of the ASEAN Sur-
veillance Process.145  AMRO remains a modest organization in terms of
budget and personnel.146  Some commentaries suggest that AMRO should
further refine its prophylactic research into two areas of work: (1) bilateral
and multilateral surveillance and (2) macroeconomic or financial sector
surveillance.147  As AMRO currently assess the financial health of the
ASEAN on a country-by-country basis, this expansion would push AMRO
closer to a role similar to that of the IMF and potentially into direct deal-
ings with the IMF.148
The degree to which AMRO should align itself with the IMF is natu-
rally contentious.  The IMF produces high-quality analyses of global eco-
nomic developments, which AMRO may use to economize on its limited
resources and to which AMRO could itself contribute.  Under the IMF
140. See id.
141. See Kawai & Morgan, supra note 135, at 19.
142. See id.
143. See Kawai, supra note 17, at 12.
144. See generally Hal Hill & Jayant Menon, Financial Safety Nets in Asia: Genesis,
Evolution, Adequacy and Way Forward, in NEW GLOBAL ECONOMIC ARCHITECTURE: THE
ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 83-111 (2014) (as referenced in Kawai, supra note 17, at 13).
145. See generally Masahiro Kawai & Cindy Houser, Evolving ASEAN+3 ERPD: To-
wards Peer Review or Due Diligence?, in SHAPING POLICY REFORM AND PEER REVIEW IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA: INTEGRATING ECONOMIES AMID DIVERSITY 65-98 (2008).
146. AMRO maintains a full-time staff of twenty researchers. See Kawai & Morgan,
supra note 135, at 19.
147. Reza Siregar & Akkharaphol Chabchitrchaidol, Enhancing the Effectiveness of
CMIM and AMRO: Challenges and Tasks, in NEW GLOBAL ECONOMIC ARCHITECTURE: THE
ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 55-82, 77 (Masahiro Kawai, et al. eds., 2014).
148. See id. at 77.
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umbrella, AMRO could create a niche in regional surveillance with a man-
date for addressing policy spillovers and finding scope for collective ac-
tion.149  On the other hand, AMRO may find its role outside the IMF as
that of a dissenter.  AMRO may offer contrasting assessments of vulnera-
bilities within the region when it disagrees with IMF findings.  AMRO’s
place in surveillance discussions with ASEAN officials, moreover, may be
more candid if it remained independent than if it carried the IMF’s politi-
cal baggage.  Finally, relying on IMF surveillance does not make sense as
the Multilateralized Chiang-Mai Initiative can be activated without IMF
input.150
This is not to say that AMRO should not borrow from the IMF.  None-
theless, AMRO should focus more on regional surveillance and spillover
issues, providing its own views on regional vulnerabilities.  AMRO must
also augment its own analytical capacity.  If AMRO can develop its own
analytical capacities to roughly resemble those of the IMF, it may be possi-
ble to “provide its own assessment as to whether a country requesting
MCMI assistance satisfies prequalification criteria and to formulate its
own independent conditionality in the event the Multilateralized Chiang-
Mai Initiative (“MCMI”) is activated without an IMF program.  Once
AMRO acquires adequate capacity, the MCIM’s link with the IMF can be
substantially reduced and ultimately eliminated.”151
C. Financial Regulatory Harmonization & Capital Markets
Launched as part of the AEC, the ASEAN Capital Market Forum
(“ACMF”) was founded to achieve greater integration of the bloc’s capital
marketplaces.  The ACMF laid out a list of objectives, which can be
broadly summarized into the following points:
1) Achieve greater harmonization in capital market standards of the
ASEAN in the areas of offering rules for debt securities, disclosure require-
ments, and distribution rules;
2) Facilitate mutual recognition arrangements or agreements for the cross
recognition of qualification and education and experience of market
professionals;
3) Achieve greater flexibility in language and governing law requirements
for securities issuance;
4) Enhance withholding tax structure, where possible, to promote the broad-
ening of the investor base in ASEAN debt issuance; and
5) Facilitate market-driven efforts to establish exchange and debt market
linkages, including cross-border capital raising activities.152
Given the disparate nature of capital marketplaces in ASEAN—rang-
ing from Singapore’s status as a global financial center to the complete
149. Kawai, supra note 17, at 21.
150. Infra at II.D.2.
151. Kawai, supra note 17, at 22.
152. Kawai & Morgan, supra note 135, at 20.
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lack of a stock exchange in Brunei and Burma—the path towards capital
integration has been a series of fits and starts.  The Managing Director of
the Monetary Authority in Singapore labeled the process disappointingly
slow during a 2015 address of the ASEAN Banking Council.153
Since its inception in 2004, the ACMF has borne limited fruit.  The
crowning achievement is the ASEAN Disclosure Standards (“Stan-
dards”),154 a framework for information disclosure regarding cross-border
issuance of debt and equity instruments.  The Standards are common to all
ASEAN member countries;155 they are further compliant against the In-
ternational Organization of Securities Commissions’ disclosure and ac-
counting standards.156  The Standards also contain an additional set of
requirements that draw on region-wide commonalities “necessitated by
the practices, laws, and regulation of [member states].”157  As of now, only
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand have actually adopted the Standards,
though other states have agreed to do so in the future.158
The ACMF also undertook to publish an ASEAN Corporate Govern-
ance Scorecard (“Scorecard”), which was intended to evaluate the per-
formance of every publicly listed company in Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.  While the scorecard was
meant to be published annually, it has only been published twice—once in
2013 and once in 2014.
An overall assessment of the ACMF’s success is difficult to make.  It
has created only two products, the Standards and the Scorecard.  The ef-
fects of both are difficult to measure.  On one hand, the creation of a com-
pletely harmonized set of disclosure standards is an analytical success and
a testament to what can be done the ASEAN way.  On the other hand, for
the Standards to have real impact, they need to be adopted by all the
ASEAN nations.  This movement is the only way to push the ASEAN
forward together as an asset class.  The Scorecard could be a boon for
intra-regional investors to understand new capital marketplaces, but it is
not published frequently.  What the “mutual recognition framework” envi-
sions is a harmonization of investment practices, rules, and regulatory re-
quirements across the ASEAN.159
153. Ravi Menon, Chairman, Managing Dir. of the Monetary Auth. of Sing., Keynote
address at the ASEAN Banking Council Meeting (June 12, 2015), http://www.bis.org/review/
r150707c.htm.
154. The ASEAN Disclosure Standards were previously called the ASEAN and Plus
Standards Scheme.
155. Kawai & Morgan, supra note 135, at 20.
156. ASEAN Disclosure Standards, ASEAN CAPITAL MKTS. FORUM, http://www
.theacmf.org/ACMF/webcontent.php?content_id=00015. (last visited May 2017) [hereinafter
ACMF Initiatives].
157. Kawai & Morgan, supra note 135, at 20.
158. See ACMF Initiatives, supra note 156.
159. ASEAN Sets Its Sights On Capital Market Integration, THE MANILA TIMES, (Apr.
5, 2015), http://www.manilatimes.net/asean-sets-its-sights-on-capital-market-integration/
173546/.
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That there are 10 separate market systems with widely-varying rules
and levels of development makes the task more than complex enough, but
because many of the reforms—for example, relaxation of foreign invest-
ment restrictions—require domestic legislation or even constitutional
changes, they fall outside the purview of the ACMF.  This makes the mar-
ket integration effort unavoidably dependent on other parts of the overall
[ASEAN] integration blueprint, which may be the market integration ef-
fort’s Achilles Heel.160
Parallel to the ACMF is the Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI)
that was launched in 2002 by the ASEAN+3.  The crux of the ABMI is the
development of local currency (“LCY”) bond markets as an alternative
source of funding to foreign-currency-denominated bank loans.  In this
manner, the ABMI acts to minimize the currency and maturity mis-
matches that made the region vulnerable to sudden reversals of capital
inflows.  Additionally, the ABMI has become another way to promote re-
gional financial cooperation and integration.  During the early years of the
ABMI, a roundtable of policy makers focused on improving access to the
LCY bond markets for various users.  These policy makers developed
model settlement systems, rules, and regulations and provided best prac-
tices to domestic credit rating agencies.161  Once models and recommen-
dations were settled, they were distributed to member states but only as
nonbinding recommendations.
The ABMI has, since 2008, achieved more cognizable success.  In 2010,
it launched the Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility (“CGIF”),
which is operated by the Asian Development Bank.  The CGIF provides
credit enhancement to increase access by investment-grade firms to LCY
bond markets and to lengthen the maturity of those bonds.162  The guar-
antees issued by the CGIF are irrevocable and unconditional commit-
ments to pay bondholders upon non-payment by the issuers through the
tenor of the bond.163  As of March 2017, the CGIF has issued seventeen
credit guarantees cumulatively valued at $1.6 billion for bonds issued by
thirteen companies in eight ASEAN member countries.
To accelerate infrastructure financing schemes through the LCY bond
market, Thailand introduced a regulation allowing sovereign issuers with
no sovereign rating to issue their own sovereign bonds on Thailand’s LCY
bond market.164  The only state to take advantage of this arrangement was
the Lao PDR, which had issued four batches of bonds by the end of 2015,
the last of which was the first Lao PDR issue to ever be rated by a credit
160. Id.
161. ASIAN DEV. BANK, The Asian Bond Markets Initiative: Policy Maker Achievements
and Challenges 3 (2017), https://asianbondsonline.adb.org/documents/abmi_achievements_
and_challenges_draft.pdf. (hereinafter Achievements and Challenges).
162. Id.
163. See generally CREDIT GUARANTEE & INV. FACILITY, About Us, http://www.cgif-
abmi.org/#about-us (last accessed November 2017).
164. Achievements and Challenges, supra note 161, at 5.
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agency.165  To whet investor appetites further, the Asian Development
Bank launched an online database providing analyses of the LCY bond
markets throughout the ASEAN+3.166  The database also includes
primers on legal and regulatory frameworks, historical trends, taxes, trad-
ing market infrastructure, and registry arrangements.  The effectiveness of
the website is extremely difficult to gauge as its impact differs from inves-
tor to investor and case by case.  Lastly, while the ABMI has spawned
many forums, sub-initiatives, and councils, none of them has risen above
the level of non-binding dialogue.
An overall assessment of the ABMI is difficult to make for reasons
similar to those regarding the ACMF.  All regulatory recommendations
and best practices must be adopted at the national level, and there is little
evidence to suggest that this has taken place to any significant extent.  The
CGIF has the potential to be a very powerful force for promoting invest-
ment in the ASEAN bond markets, but is sharply limited by its own lim-
ited capital of $1.75 million.  Despite being a recommendation from the
AMBI, Thailand’s willingness to allow foreign sovereign bonds in its own
bond market is essentially a domestic undertaking.  It does, however, offer
a strong precedential case for future cross-listings.
D. Monetary Cooperation
Regional monetary cooperation is broken up into three periods by
three different agreements: the ASEAN Swap Arrangement (“ASA”), the
Chiang-Mai Initiative (“CMI”), and the Multilateralized Chiang-Mai Initi-
ative (“MCMI”).167
1. The Chiang-Mai Initiative
The CMI was a landmark liquidity support facility for the ASEAN in-
troduced in 2000.  The purpose of the CMI was to reduce the risk of subse-
quent currency crises, manage those crises that nevertheless arise, and
quarantine potential contagion.  It began by layering on top of the ASA, a
network of bilateral swap agreements (“BSAs”) amongst China, Japan,
the Republic of Korea, and between one of these Plus-3 countries and a
select ASEAN member.168
a. The ASEAN Swap Arrangement
This arrangement began in 1977 as the ASA, itself a modest set of $100
million USD in foreign exchange swaps intended to facilitate spot sales
and forward purchases of local currency for USDs amongst the ASEAN’s
165. Id.
166. Id. at 6.
167. While an Asian Monetary Fund was broached by Japan in the immediate after-
math of the Asian Financial Crisis, the idea was abandoned in the face of resolute opposition
by both the United States and the IMF.
168. See Kawai, supra note 17, at 12.
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five largest central banks.  The arrangement was only intended to be in
place for one year, but was renewed every year up until 2000 and ex-
panded to provide credit to all ASEAN members.169  Use of the credit
agreement required a pre-existing IMF agreement with the debtor state.
This conditionality and the modest $100 million size prevented use of the
ASA in 1997 when the members’ balance of payment crisis was at its
peak.170
The leaders of the ASEAN—profoundly resentful towards the IMF for
its treatment of Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia during the Asian Finan-
cial Crisis—began convening regularly with the financial ministers of Ja-
pan, China, and the Republic of Korea to strengthen the region against
further crisis.  In 2000, representatives of the ASEAN+3 reached an agree-
ment with respect to financial cooperation:
In order to strengthen our self-help and support mechanisms in East Asia
through the ASEAN+3 framework, we recognized a need to establish a re-
gional financial arrangement supplement the existing international facilities.
As a start, we agreed to strengthen the existing cooperative frameworks
among our monetary authorities through the “Chiang Mai Initiative.” The
[CMI] involves an expanded ASEAN Swap Arrangement that would include
ASEAN countries, and a network of bilateral swap repurchase agreement fa-
cilities among ASEAN countries, China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea171
Like other ASEAN resolutions, the CMI was an agreement to conduct
further negotiations, rather than a final agreement on swap arrangements.
Subsequent negotiations did follow, however, producing marked changes.
In November 2000, the ASEAN leaders agreed to expand the ASA to $1
billion USD.  Contributions were broken up between tier 1 countries and
tier 2 countries.172  Members of both tiers were eligible to borrow the
maximum of twice their contribution.173  Swaps could be drawn for up to
six months, with a possible one-time extension of an additional six
months.174
Although this enhanced ASA served as a symbol of ASEAN solidarity,
its ability to ameliorate or prevent future crises was limited by three fea-
tures.  First, the amounts involved remained small despite the augmenta-
tion and still required IMF conditionality.  Second, creditors could opt out
of the arrangements.  Under the original ASA, opting out was only possi-
169. See id.
170. See Kawai, supra note 17, at 13.
171. ASS’N OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS, Joint Ministerial Statement of the
ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting, ASEAN.ORG (May 6, 2000), http://www.asean.org/stor
age/images/2012/Economic/AFMM/Agreement_on_Finance/The%20Joint%20Ministerial%
20Statement%20of%20the%20ASEAN.pdf (hereinafter Joint Statement on CMI).
172. Tier 1 consisted of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and
Thailand. Each tier 1 country contributed $150 million USD each. The tier 2 countries, con-
sisting of Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia, and the Laos PDR, contributed $100 million USD
in total.
173. See Joint Statement on CMI, supra note 171, at 15.
174. Id.
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ble in “exceptional financial circumstances.”  What qualifies as an excep-
tional circumstance remained undefined until 1992, when a revision to the
agreement left definition to domestic regulators.175  Third, renewal of an
outstanding swap agreement was blocked if a second country applied for
its swap.176  Nonetheless, the presence of the ASA underscored the insis-
tence by the ASEAN that it be treated as a unit and that it not be by-
passed by direct dealing through its members states.  The simultaneous
creation of an economic surveillance process created a foundation for
more dialogues in the future.
b. Bilateral Swap Agreements
The CMI provided for a potential total of thirty-three bilateral cur-
rency swap agreements: thirty agreements between each of the Plus-3 gov-
ernments (Japan, China, and the Republic of Korea) and each of the ten
ASEAN members, as well as three agreements between the Plus-3 govern-
ments.  The number of BSAs that had actually been negotiated was
slightly less than half of the potential maximum.  Again, despite the CMI
being only a commitment to negotiate further, most of these BSAs were
negotiated further.  As a result, the CMI, at its peak, totaled $92 billion
USD.
TABLE 3177
Table 1: Progress on Bilateral Swap Arrangements under the
Chiang Mai Initiative, April 2009
The CMI’s results blend a purposeful display of regional solidarity with
practical confusion.  First, the sixteen bilateral lines established by the
175. See The Chiang Mai Initiative, PETERSON INSTIT. FOR INT’L ECON., https://piie
.com/publications/chapters_preview/345/3iie3381.pdf (hereinafter Peterson on CMI).
176. Id.
177. Kawai, supra note 17, at 13.
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Plus-3 nations entailed terms that make IMF sanction necessary for acces-
sing eighty percent of the BSAs, instead of just introducing bespoke condi-
tions for the region.  The CMI’s link to an IMF program and its
conditionality was designed to address the concern that the liquidity
shortage of a requesting country might be due to fundamental policy
problems, rather than simple investor panic or a genuine external
shock.178  Second, the BSAs retained the opt-out provisions of the ASA.
Though the BSAs required that individual partner countries carry out
their bilateral agreements once a member country faced a crisis situation,
the potential creditor countries retained the right to retreat from the ar-
rangement.179  This ability to retreat created a degree of uncertainty as to
whether the needed liquidity would be fully secured by a potential bor-
rower during crisis.180  In turn, this uncertainty is exacerbated by a third
flaw: each BSA must be activated “simultaneously and equiproportion-
ately.”181  For example, if Thailand, which had a BSA with each Plus-3
nation, requested activation of one line of credit, it would automatically
activate all three lines of credit.182  This could have, potentially, en-
couraged a race to bottom, whereby all but the last potential creditor can
retreat from a BSA while nominally protecting the spirit of the CMI.  Fi-
nally, while regional in scope, the CMI was still a network of bilateral
agreements; the CMI was not itself regional.  While creditors would coor-
dinate amongst themselves to affect joint activation of a BSA, it was “in
this relatively limited sense, as well as falling under the rubric of the prin-
ciples framework, that the swaps constitute[d] a [regional] network.”183
Indeed, the CMI did not create a new institution, nor did it pool
reserves of member states under central management.  Contrary to the
hopes of regional integration, the CMI did not mobilize a substantial frac-
tion of the foreign exchange reserves of the Plus-3 nations; nor did the
BSAs constitute a network beyond the very limited definition of acting
jointly.184  On the other hand, the CMI provided financial resources that
were collectively substantial for the ASEAN.185  More importantly, the
BSAs provided a focus on concrete negotiations, economic surveillance,
and region wide financial planning.186  These advances were a tremendous
step forward for a region guided by a policy of non-interference and agree-
ments that regularly militate towards nonbinding resolutions.187  The CMI
was thus significant due to both the resources that it brought to bear on
178. Id.
179. Id. at 14
180. Id.
181. See Peterson on CMI, supra note 175, at 18.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 29.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 23.
187. Id.
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crisis negotiations and due to the precedent it set for establishing regional
institutions in the future.
2. The Multilateralized Chiang-Mai Initiative
While the CMI was more symbolic than effective, the need for a liquid-
ity support mechanism for the region appeared less urgent as the region
gradually recovered from the Asian Financial Crisis.  The principal
macroeconomic adjustments of the crisis-affected countries were through
currency depreciation and maintaining a high ratio of exports to GDP.
Most ASEAN nations posted large account surpluses throughout the early
2000s and experienced large net capital outflows.  As a result, these econo-
mies have been accumulating vast foreign reserves.188
This large accumulation of reserves provided self-insurance against the
kind of crisis that spread through the region a decade earlier.  This was less
the result of a conscious strategy to accumulate reserves and more the
outcome of exchange rate intervention to prop up the export sector.189
Even though a regional foreign exchange liquidity mechanism appeared
less urgent considering the region’s growing war chest, ASEAN ministers
maintained momentum to evolve the CMI into a more effective mecha-
nism.  At a ministerial gathering in Japan in 2007, the ASEAN+3 ministers
laid out the plans for the MCMI.190
Unlike the CMI, the MCMI is a single agreement, the terms of which
were negotiated by and applied universally to all ASEAN+3 nations.  The
total size of the MCMI was set at $240 billion USD,191 with eighty percent
contributed by the Plus-3 countries and the remaining twenty percent by
the ASEAN members.192 The IMF de-linked portion was raised from
twenty percent under the CMI to thirty percent of a country’s maximum
swap quota.  Total available credit was determined by modifying a coun-
try’s contribution by a “borrowing multiplier,” which reflected the likeli-
hood that the potential borrower would need to access the facility.193
188. See Chalongphob Sussangkarn, The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization: Ori-
gin, Development, and Outlook, 6-7 (ADBI Working Paper No. 230, 2010).
189. Id. at 7.
190. ASS’N OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS, Joint Ministerial Statement of the 10th
ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting (2007), http://www.mof.go.jp/english/international_poli
cy/convention/asean_plus_3/20070505.htm (“[W]e unanimously agreed in principle that a
self-managed reserve pooling arrangement governed by a single contractual agreement is an
appropriate form of multilateralization.”).
191. The facility was expanded from its initial $120 billion to $240 billion in 2012. The
borrowing multipliers and each nation’s relative contribution remained the same.
192. Sussangkarn, supra note 188, at 8.
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TABLE 4194
Table 2: Financial Contributions, Maximum Swap Amount, and Voting Powers
under the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization
The ministers also decided on a broad decision-making mechanism for
managing the MCMI.195  Fundamental issues—review of the total size,
contributions, borrowing multipliers, admission, and potential conditional-
ity—are decided by consensus of the ASEAN+3.  Lending issues—princi-
pal amount, renewals, and terms of default—are decided by majority
vote.196  The MCMI also created a sub-facility dedicated to crisis preven-
tion.  While relatively small at $24 billion USD, access to any portion of
the sub-facility requires no IMF conditionality.197  The motivation for its
creation came from the mini-won crisis of 2008, wherein the Republic of
Korea turned to the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States for liquid-
ity support as it had not yet reached the crisis conditions necessary to acti-
vate the CMI, nor did it want to deal with the IMF.198
The MCMI is an improvement over the CMI.  The credit facility is sub-
stantially larger; as a multilateral agreement, it represents a truly regional
effort.  The IMF de-linked portion is also substantially larger, both with
regard to the primary credit facility and the crisis prevention sub-facility.
Additionally, the dual voting system pays homage to the ASEAN Way
194. Kawai, supra note 17, at 16.
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without sacrificing the MCMI’s efficacy.199  These achievements notwith-
standing, there is still the question of whether enough progress has been
made to counter liquidity crises without sacrificing regional governance.
There are three key problems: the adequacy of the MCMI, the remaining
IMF link, and procedural clarity should the facility need activation.
TABLE 5200
Table 3: Available Financial Resources under the International Monetary Fund Rapid
Financing Instrument and the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization’s
International Monetary Fund-Delinked Portion
The total amount that a member country can draw from the MCMI
equals its contribution times its purchasing multiple.  Even with the in-
crease in the total size of the facility, the maximum swap quota available
to any country is likely insufficient for crisis response—the IMF de-linked
portion is certainly too small.  For instance, the maximum amount availa-
ble to Thailand is $23 billion USD.  While this exceeds the amount ar-
ranged under the IMF package during the Asian Financial Crisis, which
was $17 billion USD, it is still smaller than the amounts raised for the
Republic of Korea and Indonesia ($58 and $42 billion USD respectively)
arranged during the crisis.201  More troublingly, the IMF de-linked por-
tion—the most important component in the greater concern of regional
199. The dual voting structure ensures that the most important class of issues are still
consensus and thus abides by the ASEAN’s soft policy of non-interference. The issues de-
cided by simple majority vote grant the MCMI greater efficacy on financial issues.
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integration—is vanishingly small.  Thailand and Indonesia could only ac-
cess $6.8 billion without IMF conditionality; the Republic of Korea only
$11.5 billion.  Notably, the mini-won crisis that spurred the creation of the
prophylactic sub-facility proved this amount was insufficient.  Facing con-
ditions that did not yet constitute a crisis under the MCMI, the Republic
of Korea secured $30 billion bilateral swap arrangement with the U.S. Fed.
To counter another crisis using the MCMI, then, the total size of credit
available must increase.  Given the IMF stigma left in many countries af-
fected by the Asian Financial Crisis,202 the IMF de-linked portion must
also be expanded so that an ASEAN member may access credit without
worrying about an IMF program.
There are several ways that the MCMI can be modified to meet these
worries.  First, the total resources could be doubled.  This would dramati-
cally raise the maximum available amount as well as the de-linked por-
tion.203  Second, the purchasing multiples can be increased for the most
vulnerable nations and decreased for more robust economies.  At the ex-
treme, the multiple could be reduced to zero for the Plus-3 nations, which
are unlikely to depend on the MCMI.  Third, the IMF de-linked portion
could be increased to one-hundred percent.204
As noted above, the IMF program requirement was initially put in
place to address the concern that the liquidity shortage of a requesting
country might be due to fundamental policy problems, rather than simple
investor-panic or to a genuine external shock.  This concern could be alle-
viated if a regional organization, namely AMRO, were to take the place of
the IMF in identifying nations that have fundamental faults by suggesting
reform programs of its own design.  Finally, there is a lack of clarity over
procedural matters pertaining to the activation of the MCMI.  There is no
precise economic information that is required for other MCMI members
to make decisions on emergency assistance.  When a financial crisis strikes
a member country’s responsiveness will be essential.  Without any set cri-
teria, such as “what information should be prepared when requesting as-
sistance, what steps should be taken before contacting [MCMI] chair
countries, and to whom they should speak if they need to use the facility
very soon,” activation may be delayed beyond the point MCMI’s useful-
ness.205  King amongst these problems is that the MCMI lacks a perma-
nent secretary in charge of its activation.  While AMRO is involved in the
process insofar as it provides research services, an easy solution to this
problem could be to seat the secretary within AMRO itself.
202. Takatoshi Ito, Can Asia Overcome the IMF Stigma?, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 198, 198
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III. ASSESSING THE ASEAN INITIATIVES
Cooperation in financial policy among the ASEAN economies has a
limited history and limited results, even though the region’s need for mar-
ket reforms is part and parcel of the region’s declared goals of economic
betterment.  Past regional initiatives on financial issues have lacked practi-
cality and efficacy or, in the case of the Asian Monetary Fund, have been
resolutely sent to the gallows.  This result leads one to doubt the possibil-
ity of an effective regional financial body, especially given the strong role
that the ASEAN Way of collective noninterference has played in deter-
mining norms of regional governance, particularly in the security realm.206
The ASEAN’s financial integration has lacked an institutional or bind-
ing legal framework.  In contrast to the rules-focused WTO or EU, the
region’s organizations have been oriented to have minimal impact on na-
tional rule.  Instead, most pay lip-service to the idea of financial integra-
tion and pass the issue of enforceable agreements to bilateral negotiations.
Taking heed of the significant governance and economic imperatives for
integration is an important step, but it is merely the first step.  The AFTA,
AFAS, APEC, ACTFA, and the ASEAN-ANZ FTA all sustain and but-
tress this criticism.  Asia has no over-arching political structure compara-
ble to the EU and, judging from these agreements, there appears to be
little appetite to concede national sovereignty.  While the ASEAN Way
appeared initially to be both a strong impetus to integrate (as it would
foster an ever-closer Southeast Asian community) and a political expedi-
ent on the path towards integration, perhaps the bloc’s policy of noninter-
ference is the ultimate impediment to greater financial integration.  This is
all further exacerbated by great diversity in terms of economic and finan-
cial development, institutional quality, regulatory regimes, and capital ac-
count openness.207
The integration initiatives that have formed since 2000 have been much
stronger, not only because they made cognizable steps towards financial
integration, but because they have addressed the financial, governance
and crisis imperatives for integration.  The ACMF’s Standards and Score-
card provide the basic tools for market participants to both offer and
purchase debt and equity securities.  The ABMI transcended its initial role
as a mere policy forum to create a credit guarantee facility dedicated to
infrastructure projects, to create an online database to enhance trans-
parency in the LCY bond market, and to push Thailand to allow the novel
sale of Lao PDR sovereign bonds in its own marketplace.  The ERPD and
the AMRO provide regional surveillance and prophylactic measures to
militate against the chance of another crisis.  If the AMRO can develop its
institutional capacity, it could potentially eliminate the IMF link from the
MCMI by becoming a new monetary authority.  Similarly, the MCMI, by
206. See, e.g., Nick Bisley, The End of East Asian Regionalism?, 17 J. EAST ASIAN AFF.
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evolving beyond the participatory problems of the CMI, proves that the
ASEAN Way is not an insurmountable hurdle on the path towards finan-
cial integration.
The principal fault of these organizations is not that they are patently
ineffectual, but that, in their current incarnations, they do not do enough.
The ERPD, AMRO, ACMF, ABMI, and MCMI all have obvious paths
that they must follow to become more robust.  Each is theoretically well
structured to address the various integration imperatives, but none is cur-
rently large enough to be deemed properly successful.  This is essentially a
problem of time.  The ASEAN has only been focused on financial integra-
tion in the 20 years since the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997.  To extrapolate
the potential for increased institutional efficacy, it is instructive to turn
briefly to the case of the EU.
European officials were early to recognize the potential benefits of,
and barriers to, financial integration.  The 1966 Segré report identified a
home bias towards national governments and other domestic actors due to
restrictions on permissible cross-border investment activity.208  Few corpo-
rate securities were listed outside of their home markets.  These conditions
generally reflect the current condition of the ASEAN’s financial markets,
advanced technical sophistication notwithstanding.209  Financial integra-
tion in the EU is now the most developed of any region—the result of
“ratcheting up objectives adopted over a long period since the 1950s, lead-
ing in particular to the creation of a single market in financial services and
a single European currency.”210
While the EU founding treaties provided for the free movement of
goods, services, and capital, these principles had no specific substance until
EU financial integration turned to focus on harmonizing minimum stan-
dards.211  Full harmonization proved impossible until the passage of the
Single European Act, which created a common EU market based on “mu-
tual recognition and common minimum standards, made applicable by EU
directives and brought into effect through domestic law.”212  Much unlike
the ASEAN policy of noninterference, EU member states must generally
adhere to certain precepts so that legislation at the EU level will directly
affect actors in individual states, while national governments may be liable
in damages for failing to implement EU legislation.213  Advantaging its
comparatively greater power over member states, the EU has created the
most developed regional institutions for financial supervision, regulation,
and resolution.  In so doing, it has also created the highest regional inte-
208. See generally SEGRÉ ET AL., EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF A EUROPEAN CAPITAL MARKET: REPORT OF A GROUP OF EXPERTS APPOINTED BY
THE EEC COMMISSION (1996) (as referenced in Arner et al., supra note 3, at 33).
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210. Id. at 34.
211. Id. at 35.
212. Id. at 36.
213. Id. at 35.
Fall 2017] Financial Integration and Cooperation in the ASEAN 157
gration of rules, standards, and procedures.  The EU financial architecture
covers “financial intermediaries, securities regulation, accounting, com-
pany law, and regulation for institutional investors.”214  Nonetheless, ma-
jor variances in national practices and institutions remain.  Again
obviating any de jure or de facto indices of integration and focusing on
institutional quality, the EU still faces many obstacles:
Continued diversity of financial systems, laws, and regulatory structures and
practices; a complex system, with large number of players with overlapping
responsibilities and potential conflicts of interest; continued evolution of EU-
wide supervisory agencies with largely untested powers; large size, potential
cumbersomeness, and lack of strong authority of the ESRB; national resis-
tance to an expanded EU-wide authority and a tendency to protect domestic
financial industries; inadequate information sharing; weak cross-border super-
visory cooperation based on MOUs lacking legal force and tending to be over-
ridden in crisis; and a lack of a legal framework for resolution and deposit
insurance of cross-border financial firms.215
The EU’s protracted experience of forming an integrated marketplace
indicates the scale of the problem facing the ASEAN as it develops finan-
cially.216  The EU is not, of course, a perfect proxy.  The ASEAN econo-
mies are much more diverse in terms of financial development,
macroeconomic concerns, and institutional capacity than the EU.  Thus,
reference to the EU cannot divine the appropriate level of financial regu-
latory cooperation and according institutional capacity.217  What it can il-
lustrate is that the ASEAN institutions need to be evaluated in the
ASEAN context and that those institutions cannot be criticized only be-
cause they are not large enough.  The ASEAN will inevitably undergo
greater financial development, and the degree of institutional breadth will
develop.  The ERPD, AMRO, ACMF, ABMI, and MCMI are successes
because they are structured to allow the ASEAN to address the financial,
governance, and crisis imperatives for integration.
Lastly, some scholars have suggested the ASEAN’s recent success in
establishing a regional order can be attributed to China’s growing enthusi-
asm for normalizing regional relationships.  China’s own economic détente
in the mid-1990s coincided with the Asian Financial Crisis.  The sixth
ASEAN summit, held in Hanoi in December 1998, committed members to
“a higher plane of regional cooperation to strengthen ASEAN’s effective-
ness in dealing with the challenges of [the global economy].”218  While
China’s early foreign direct investment into the ASEAN was a significant
infusion, it is also responsible for pulling investment away from the
ASEAN.  “The rise of China after 1998, and its attraction for foreign in-
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vestors, actually affected growth negatively in Southeast Asia, whose low-
technology manufacturing industries also depend on foreign direct invest-
ment.”219  China has had an even more contentious relationship with the
ASEAN in the security context, where China’s occupation of the Spratley
Islands and Mischief Reef have articulated “Beijing’s willingness to use
force as an instrument of foreign policies,” even against its economic al-
lies.220  Furthermore, while China has certainly had a say in ASEAN+3
initiatives, its ability to drive discussions is limited by the ASEAN’s insis-
tence on consensus-building and unanimity.
China’s willingness to participate in the ASEAN+3 system despite fre-
quent security clashes with other members and the simple fact that it
stands to gain little from any development initiatives is similar to its impe-
tus to launch the Asian Infrastructure Bank.  As part of its “One Belt,
One Road,” initiative, China wants to create the infrastructure necessary
to sustain its own investments in Southeast Asia.221  China is also trying to
become a new financial hegemon in the region.  China has regularly
voiced its displeasure with the slow decision-making of the IMF, the World
Bank, and its own minor position relative to its economic influence.  While
China is incapable of forcing ASEAN decision-making, it is capable of
positioning itself as a necessary precondition to robust financial integra-
tion in the ASEAN.
CONCLUSION
Faced with significant imperatives to integrate financially, the ASEAN
has launched a number of region-wide initiatives.  Most of the early at-
tempts under the umbrella of the ASEAN Economic Community are un-
substantial.  The AFTA, AFAS, APEC, ACTFA, and the ASEAN-ANZ
FTA edge closer to non-binding resolutions—ineffective agreements to
agree that do not actually compel the member states to bridge their mar-
kets.  In contrast, the later agreements—ERPD, AMRO, ACMF, ABMI,
and MCMI—are significant structural achievements.  While the various
surveillance organizations, capital market initiatives, and credit facilities
are not robust enough to be called categorical success, they lay the
groundwork for a regional financial community that address the specific
problems that the ASEAN has faced because of its connection to extra-
regional institutions and markets.  Despite its shortcomings and slow pace,
the ASEAN provides a feasible and relevant case for regulatory coopera-
tion on a voluntary basis.222
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